A "Viewpoint" article on what amounts to the op-ed page of Aviation Week, by a couple of professors of supply chain management from Rutgers business school. As management gurus, they concentrate on the management of the 787 project. The unusual feature of the Boeing project was the subcontracting out of vast pieces of the airframe. Wings, tails, the fuselage itself, were designed and built by subcontractors. The Aviation Week writers, as management guru's see the project's three year lateness as a management problem. If all you have is a hammer, every thing looks like a nail.
They point out that it only takes one late subcontractor to hold up the entire project, whereas the subcontractors who work hard and deliver on time don't get rewarded for their efforts. They say that the project slipped because a few unmotivated subcontractors were late, or delivered substandard work that had to be done over.
I used to earn my living in the engineering business. Once we got a job, we always went full out to do it right and do it on time. Our motivation? Simple, we all knew that if we didn't make the customer happy, we'd never get another job from him. So I don't really believe in the management gurus ingenious theories of motivation.
2 comments:
I agree, it over simplifies.
Compare the 787 with the F-35 and "Star Wars" (civil and military), huge failures to foresee what may have been unforeseeable? Is "the hindsight of a child better than the foresight of a genius", like Churchill said?
Perhaps I: Take more and shorter steps, some advocate the Block Upgrade technique, from the start. But, surely that increases costs and the contract goes to those that are bold and willing to take risks, right?
Perhaps II: Assign Team A to plan the development and Team B to find flaws with the plan. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory used that in its development of laser weapons, to good effect. But, they are military and used to take orders, knowing their careers depend on how good their work is, based on results, their future does not depend on which side they are assigned.
The laser planners never knew how well they understood laser physics, the F-35 have yet to admit how well they know of complex air flows. Remember, when the inventor of the human powered flight decided to build the plane, he started by defining slow-speed Aerodynamic equations. He knew, he didn't, and nobody else did, know how to compute air flow at slow speeds.
History can sometimes help:
1. Every vertical take off airplane designed was totally different and they all failed.
2. The knowledge of laser physics is yet to be discovered. The dream of production of energy from the ocean is not a nightmare, not yet.
3. How soon will the F-35 make a vertical take off in Afghanistan or Denver?
Well, I think Boeing got in trouble by awarding vital subcontracts to firms that simply were not competent to do the work. When a prime contractor throws out juicy subcontracts, everybody in the world will submit a bid. You can't go with the lowest bidder if the lowest bidder cannot do the work. If the bidder lacks the experience, the facilities, the tools, the people, the money, or the morale, then awarding them a contract is a disaster. They won't deliver (but they will spend all the money).
The qualification of subcontractors is subjective. Experienced men, after some plant visits and some interviews with key personnel, can tell the qualified bidder from the unqualified. But a lot of the things that go into such a decision are subjective, like "Their chief engineer is a chucklehead", or "Their union is just itching to stick it to management"
Could it be that after Boeing's experienced men recommended disqualifying a lowest bidder, Boeing's suits give the job to an unqualified bidder just to save a little money?
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