Maybe we issue too many secret clearances?

The Washington Navy Yard massacre was perpetrated by a contractor holding a secret clearance.  Such clearances are supposed to be issued only to people worthy of holding positions of great trust for the United States.  Clearly a homicidal maniac is not such a person.  Within a few days the news media turned up derogatory information that should have disqualified him from a security clearance, and in fact for holding any kind of defense related job.  Obviously the security vetting  failed in Aaron Alexis' case. 
    It probably comes down to too many clearances to be processed with too little time and too little manpower.  Because today, everything is classified and every one needs a clearance just to go to work.  And work backs up if the clearances aren't granted.  In sort, rampant over classification of everything, means nothing is protected.  If everything is classified, then nothing gets extra protection.
   Many years ago I was an avionics maintenance officer on America's newest hottest jet fighter.  In those days, only a few things that would assist an enemy in jamming the fighter's radar were classified.  Everything thing else, fire control, IFF, guided missiles, radar, IR, electronic navigation, data link, gyros, you name it, was unclassified.  The enlisted men who repaired and overhauled the aircraft systems didn't need clearances.  The technical orders (aircraft manuals) were unclassified, the troops could carry them around, out to the flight line, to the chow hall, where ever, without keeping them under lock and key. 
  Years later I was working on the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), a clever arrangement of cameras and computers that could spot the launch of anti aircraft missiles and warn the pilot.  The computer would get on the aircraft intercom and cry "Missile, Missile, Missile" into the crew's earphones.  On the Common Missile Warning System EVERYTHING was classified.  All the technicians needed a Secret clearance just to enter the building.  The guys that swept the floor needed clearances.  All the manuals were classified and kept in safes.  Guys worked on the equipment from memory, since the manuals were too highly classified to be allowed out on the workbench.   New guys couldn't start work until their clearances came thru.  Which could take months and months.  We always had half a dozen new guys just sitting around waiting for clearances so we could put them to work. 
    In actual fact there was nothing in the CMWS   shops that would have done the enemy any good if he had gotten to it.  The system worked off the light given off by the rocket motor,  there is nothing you can do to change that.  The electronic boxes were all programmable logic arrays and microprocessors.  You need the source code in order to figure out how they worked, to either duplicate them or figure out how to fool them.  There was no source code in our shops, we couldn't read it, and didn't need it.  New boxes coming off the line were bench tested.  If they failed bench test we changed chips until they worked.  No source code needed. 
   If CMWS classification been reduced to the level we had on the F106 fighter program, it would have reduced the number of clearances a lot.  If we looked thruout the defense department, we could find a LOT of overly classified programs.  We could save money and tighten security all in one simple reform,
  "He who defends everything defends nothing".  Old military aphorism probably from Frederick the Great.  "He who classifies everything defends nothing".  New military aphorism from yours truly. 
   If we had fewer clearances to process, perhaps we could take the time to investigate each case and deny clearances to homicidal maniacs.