TV news reports that a deal was reached with Iran last night. No details are given. What ever happened to "open covenants, openly arrived at"? (One of Woodrow Wilson's 14 points from 100 years ago). One suspects that the deal isn't that good for us.
Oh By the way. The right to enrich is the right to make nuclear weapons. Iran lacks any right to enrich, or to have the bomb.
Showing posts with label nuclear proliferation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear proliferation. Show all posts
Sunday, November 24, 2013
Iran goes for the bomb
All the Iranians (or anyone else) needs to make a nuclear bomb, is enough fissionable material, either 90% uranium 235 or plutonium. U235 occurs in nature. 0.7% of natural uranium is the fissionable U235, the rest is stable U238 which won't make a bomb. Plutonium does not occur in nature, it has to be made in a nuclear reactor.
The Iranians have built up a huge battery of 19,000 centrifuges to separate the fissionable U235 from the inert U238. They have been running the centrifuges long enough to create tons of uranium enriched to 20%. Concentrating from 20% to 90% is easier than what they have already done, concentrating from 0.7% to 20%. Iran is withing spitting distance of the bomb.
The last thing the world needs is nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranian crazies.
So, as the Iranians moved closer to the bomb, we set up an economic blockade on Iran. The US Senate made it law. They can't import anything technical, not even auto parts, they can't sell their oil. Surprisingly, this is working. Iran is hurting enough to start bargaining.
Only the deal the Iranians are offering is "We promise not to make a bomb, and you lift the blockade."
Such a deal. And Obama wanted to accept it.
Fortunately the French were wise enough to reject this "deal". And probably the US Senate won't fall for it either.
The deal we want is "You Iranians turn all your uranium and all your centrifuges over to us, and permit no notice inspections of every place in your country. And you don't get to have reactors. After that is accomplished to our satisfaction, then we will lift the blockade."
If we let the Iranians get the bomb, their neighbors, Saudi and Iraq will build their own bombs. The Pakis and the Israelis already have the bomb.
The Iranians have built up a huge battery of 19,000 centrifuges to separate the fissionable U235 from the inert U238. They have been running the centrifuges long enough to create tons of uranium enriched to 20%. Concentrating from 20% to 90% is easier than what they have already done, concentrating from 0.7% to 20%. Iran is withing spitting distance of the bomb.
The last thing the world needs is nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranian crazies.
So, as the Iranians moved closer to the bomb, we set up an economic blockade on Iran. The US Senate made it law. They can't import anything technical, not even auto parts, they can't sell their oil. Surprisingly, this is working. Iran is hurting enough to start bargaining.
Only the deal the Iranians are offering is "We promise not to make a bomb, and you lift the blockade."
Such a deal. And Obama wanted to accept it.
Fortunately the French were wise enough to reject this "deal". And probably the US Senate won't fall for it either.
The deal we want is "You Iranians turn all your uranium and all your centrifuges over to us, and permit no notice inspections of every place in your country. And you don't get to have reactors. After that is accomplished to our satisfaction, then we will lift the blockade."
If we let the Iranians get the bomb, their neighbors, Saudi and Iraq will build their own bombs. The Pakis and the Israelis already have the bomb.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Hacking thru the radar
Last week's Israeli Air Force strike in Syria may have used advanced electronic deception transmissions to confuse the up-to-date Russian made Syrian anti aircraft defenses. Systems are known that can invade air defense communications systems, cause them to transmit their radar views back to the attackers, and even issue false orders to cause sensors to look away from attackers, designate radar tracks as friendly, or insert false tracks.
Seeing the enemy radar's view is extremely valuable to attackers, it shows the blind spots in enemy radar coverage and lets the strike aircraft know when they are flying low enough to avoid detection. Radars contain various circuits or software to filter out clutter. It may be possible to crank those filter setting up so high that the attacker's radar tracks are filtered out. Or have the radar label the attackers tracks as friendly airliners. Or simply fill the system with so many false targets that the real attackers are lost in the crowd.
Hard information is a little scarce, Aviation Week is reduced to quoting Arab newspaper articles. "Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the-art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory" according to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan. It goes on to say "Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same system and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions".
Syria has recently acquired the Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) a mobile system with guidance radar, missile launchers and missile reloads all mounted on tracked vehicles. Tor-1 costs $29 million per system.
The actual site of the attack, and it's contents are still a matter of dispute. Some reports place the attack at Tall Al-Abyad up in the Turkish border, others place it at Day az-Zawr out near the Iraqi border. The site may have contained nuclear material on route from North Korea to Iran, or it may have been a more run-of-the-mill storage for conventional munitions bound for Iraq, or Hezballah, or Iran. News reports are conflicting.
Naturally successful use of secret electronic countermeasures tells the enemy that his system is vulnerable and that codes must be changed and fixes invented. The Syrian target must have been pretty high value for the Israelis to disclose the effectiveness of their electronic countermeasures.
Seeing the enemy radar's view is extremely valuable to attackers, it shows the blind spots in enemy radar coverage and lets the strike aircraft know when they are flying low enough to avoid detection. Radars contain various circuits or software to filter out clutter. It may be possible to crank those filter setting up so high that the attacker's radar tracks are filtered out. Or have the radar label the attackers tracks as friendly airliners. Or simply fill the system with so many false targets that the real attackers are lost in the crowd.
Hard information is a little scarce, Aviation Week is reduced to quoting Arab newspaper articles. "Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the-art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory" according to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan. It goes on to say "Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same system and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions".
Syria has recently acquired the Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) a mobile system with guidance radar, missile launchers and missile reloads all mounted on tracked vehicles. Tor-1 costs $29 million per system.
The actual site of the attack, and it's contents are still a matter of dispute. Some reports place the attack at Tall Al-Abyad up in the Turkish border, others place it at Day az-Zawr out near the Iraqi border. The site may have contained nuclear material on route from North Korea to Iran, or it may have been a more run-of-the-mill storage for conventional munitions bound for Iraq, or Hezballah, or Iran. News reports are conflicting.
Naturally successful use of secret electronic countermeasures tells the enemy that his system is vulnerable and that codes must be changed and fixes invented. The Syrian target must have been pretty high value for the Israelis to disclose the effectiveness of their electronic countermeasures.
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