Robert Gates gives a farewell address

Gates, the out going defense secretary made a few remarks, reported upon
here
He bemoaned the Pentagon procurement system but without offering either an explanation of what is wrong with it, let alone how to fix it. This is unfortunate, so I will attempt to lay out the real procurement problem, gold plating.
Gold plating is the tendency to specify the platforms be equipped every new gadget imaginable, kinda like ordering a new car fully loaded. Take an example from ancient history, the C-5 transport plane. This design goes back to the 1960's. At base, the C-5 was to be the biggest transport that could fly using then new and much more powerful jet engines. It had double the engine power of the contemporary C-141 which yielded a whale of a plane. Flying cargo, including big cargo, to and from real airports (ones with concrete runways) it would have been a very useful machine to have.
It was the first transport aircraft big enough to actually get off the ground carrying a real Army tank, not a light weight "airborne" tank, but a main battle tank, the M1 Abrams. The Army was overjoyed, and began to have visions of future air assaults. The paratroops jump in, capture some bean patch behind enemy lines, then the C-5's swoop in and unload the tanks. Presto, you have a real armored division operating at some strategic spot with complete tactical surprise. Trouble is, landing a whale of an airplane, with a 50 ton tank inside it, on dirt runway doesn't really work. The wheels sink in and the whale is stuck, and blocking the runway. Nothing, not even a tank, is going to tow a stuck C-5 anywhere. It might tear the nose gear off, but it won't move the C-5. Or die hard enemy defenders drop a mortar round on the C-5 as it's unloading and again you have the runway blocked with a blazing and unmovable whale.
To support the "land on dirt runway" requirement, the C-5 was equipped with a fantastic landing gear of 28 wheels. Truly ingenious design solved the problem of retracting this forest of wheels. To go with the 28 wheels, it needed 28 disc brakes, 28 anti skid sensors and an anti skid control box smart enough to figure out which wheel[s] needed less brake pressure and which needed more. I watched a C-5 land at Altus AFB back in the '70's. Touchdown was smooth, followed by flying rubber as some tires blew. At debriefing the aircrew said "Fairly normal landing, we only blew three tires". Antiskid had managed to lock up some of the wheels, and sliding the locked tires along the concrete runway wore right thru the tread.
Then came the requirement for "truck bed loading height", which means having the cargo deck at the height of an ordinary Army truck so cargo pallets could slide off the C-5 onto a truck, no forklift required. Sounds benign. Trouble is, after you get a huge plane that low to the ground, you cannot rotate for takeoff because the tail scrapes on the runway. To solve this problem, the fantastic landing gear was redesigned to "kneel", lowering the entire C-5 to the ground, and then later, jacking the whole plane up high enough to take off.
Then they added a "Maintenance Data Computer" which didn't do much, an unnecessary nose loading door to go with the tail loading door, and a bunch of other stuff that I no longer remember at this remove in time.
Now the C-5 had all the stuff everyone wanted in it. But adding stuff made the plane heavy, heavier than the specification allowed. Lockheed was driven to incredible lengths to trim the weight down to meet spec. This included making the brake rotors (all 28 of them) out of beryllium. Beryllium costs more than gold. When everything else failed, Lockheed made the aluminum skin thinner. This would have fateful consequences later in the C-5's life.
The contract was "firm fixed fee" for a an initial production run (Run A) of 52 C-5's. Lockheed lost barrels of money on each plane it built. When it came time for a contract for the next 52 airplanes (Run B) Lockheed held out for a price that let them earn a little money on each plane. That price was stiff. So stiff that one Air Force general said "I'll haul the troops in gooney birds before I pay that kind of money". His view prevailed, there was no Run B. The 52 C-5's of Run A were all there ever were. They are still flying.
Lessons that should have been learned. Don't specify things that aren't absolutely necessary to accomplish the primary mission. The C-5 was good at moving vast amounts of stuff to and from real airports. Spec'ing in dirt field operation and truck bed loading turned a good airplane into a hangar queen, and sent the cost thru the roof.
These lessons probably have not been learned to this day.